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IT is to be doubted whether legal science owes more to Mr.
Justice Holmes than it does' to the uncommon scholar who fifty
years ago lectured on The Common Law." Both scholar and
judge have the same marks of genius: nowhere a clearer, more
prophetic vision of the realities of law; nowhere a more poetic
power to clothe living thought in vivid, enduring vesture. Yet
the judge could scarce have been without the scholar; his great-
ness is the scholar's. And the scholar's medium is more reveal-
ing, less transient, than that of the judge. It does not break
into fragmentary episodes which tend to fuse into the majestic
but shifting mosaic of the law; it reaches to a higher and more
impressionable intellectual level than that addressed by the judi-
cial opinion; it has greater projection in time and space. Never-
theless, it were ungracious to regret that the scholar became the
judge, for, before doing so, he gave us the one outstanding,
American work on the history of the Common Law and has at
times returned to write the judge's papers and the more im-
portant of his addresses. The significance of this scholarly work
is out of all proportion to its bulk, principally because it sug-
gests a philosophy of law which has been a precious gift of
prophecy to legal science.
No one can speak for another, certainly not for him whose
words are beyond paraphrase. Without endeavoring to do so,
perhaps one who can scarce claim to have been touched by
Holmes' mantle, who owes more immediate debts to such diverse
creditors as Bentham, Althusius and Maine, Vinogradoff and
Munroe Smith, may appropriately sketch an interpretation of
Holmes' view of legal science. At the least, his admiration and
belief that this view still awaits realization will not be charged
to familiar prejudice.
In Holmes' view of legal science, there are three chief elements
which it is instructive to distinguish-the theory of legal his-
tory, the canons of dogmatic study, and the rational or scientific
ideal. These elements; not unrelated, are differentiated in the
major addresses, The Path of the Law 2 (1897) and Law in
Science and Science in Law 3 (1899). Roughly speaking, the
basic structure is the theory of legal history as outlined in the
first lecture on The Common Law; " this, enriched by judicial
1 HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW (1881).
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS (1921) 167.
3 koid. 210.
4 1OLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 1.
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,experience and projected upon contemporary legal study, be-
comes the canons of dogmatic study in The Path of the Law.
The rational or scientific ideal, envisaged in the two addresses
-mentioned, is the conclusion of the argument. We shall first
endeavor to formulate, perforce with all the imperfection of
brevity, the cardinal implications of the theory, the canons and
the ideal, and then venture a summary glance at their validity,
limits and present pertinence.
First, then, as to the theory of legal history. "Historical ex-
-planation has two directions or aspects, one practical and the
other abstractly scientific." s The latter involves the study of
law as "a great anthropological document," or as "an exercise
in the morphology and transformation of human ideas." 1 The
,emphasis is, however, upon the practical aspects of historical
study: "The main ends of the subject are practical." 7 "History
is the means by which we measure the power which the past
has had to govern the present in spite of ourselves, so to speak,
by imposing traditions which no longer meet their original end.
History sets us free and enables us to make up our minds dis-
-passionately whether the survival which we are enforcing ans-
wers any new purpose when it has ceased to answer the old." 8
This is a vigorous conception of historical study, which has
little sympathy for mere antiquarianism: investigation directed
"to a crucial point" counts; 0 "our only interest in the past is
for the -light it throws upon the present." 10
The study of the present by reference to the past, the possi-
bilities of which are so brilliantly illustrated in The Common
Law, necessarily invites a theory of legal evolution. The funda-
mental hypothesis is the paradox of form and substance in law:
"The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to
be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to
which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much
u.pon its past." "
This hypothesis, simple, subtle and profound, is the cornerstone
of Holmes' view of legal science as well as of his theory of legal
history.




9 "The man of science in the law is not merely a book-worm. To a
microscopic eye for detail he must unite an insight which tells him what
details are significant. Not every maker of exact investigation counts,
but only he who directs his investigation to a crucial point." Ibid. 224.
lo Ibid. 194.
11 HOLmES, THE CoimON LAW (1881) 1-2.
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The implications which the hypothesis holds for legal history
were explicitly set out in 1881. These may be summarized as
follows. First, an empirical conception of law. "Law, being a
practical thing, must found itself on actual forces." 12 Second,
that "in substance the growth of the law is legislative," ", not
only in content but in its grounds. Hence the importance of
"the felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men," 14
in the interpretation and adaptation of ancient rules or the crea-
tion of new. Third, the secondary significance of logical forms.
and the consequent "failure of all theories which consider the
law only from its formal side." 15 "The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience." 10 Fourth, the existence of
primitive survivals in law, which render historical study neces-
sary to understand a legal system purporting to follow preced-
ents, 7-- survivals, the justification for which when identified by
historical study, may effectively be reconsidered.'8 Finally, the
desirability of an actualistic description of the process, involving
not only "a more conscious recognition of the legislative func-
tion of the courts" but also the progressive measurement of
human conduct by more "external or objective" and less moral.
legal standards.29
Second, the canons of dogmatic study. These, as has been
intimated, are in effect the application of the theory of legal
history to contemporary professional legal study. And, as
might be anticipated, the propositions are analogous. In the
first place, the conception of the "body of dogma or systematized
prediction which we call the law," 20 is practical, realistic. "The
object of our study, then, is prediction, the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts." 21
In the second place, the conception is objective. The study is
"of the law as a business with well understood limits, a body
of dogma within definite lines." 22 Hence, to avoid confusion,
the necessity of distinction between law and ethics, of a "bad








19 Ibid. 36, 38.
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"If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look
at it as a bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one,
who finds his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or
outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of conscience." 23
It should be noted that this canon of professional study does not
deny ethics or its fundamental relation to law. "The law is the
witness and external deposit of our moral life." 24
In the third place, the means of prediction are, in principle,
the reports. The reports are "the oracles of the law. Far
the most important and pretty nearly the whole meaning of
every new effort of legal thought is to make these prophecies
more precise, and to generalize them into a thoroughly con-
nected system." 25 "The number of our predictions when gen-
eralized and reduced to a system is not unmanageably large." 211
In this Holmes is essentially in accord with Langdell.
In the fourth place, the necessity of analysis and generaliza-
tion in prediction fixes the position of jurisprudence and theory
in dogmatic study. "Theory is the most important part of the
dogma of the law, as the architect is the most important man
who takes part in the building of a house. The most important
improvements of the last twenty-five years are improvements in
theory."27 The theory and the jurisprudence here referred to
are indigenous, not comparative. "The way to gain a liberal
view of your subject is not to read something else, but to get
to the bottom of the subject itself.' 28 Hence, the study of Roman
law in a professional curriculum is not advocated. -
In the fifth place, the method of prediction is not merely
logical or mathematical:
"The danger of which I speak is not the admission that the
principles governing other phenomena also govern the law, but
the notion that a given system, ours, for instance, can be worked
out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct....
"This mode of thinking is entirely natural. The training of
lawyers is a training in logic. The processes of analogy, dis-
crimination, and deduction are those in which they are most at
home. The language of judicial decision is mainly the language
of logic. And the logical method and form flatter that longing
for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind.
But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny
of man. Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the rela-








29 Ibid. 197ff., 155ff.
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often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and
yet the very root and nerve of the whole proceeding." 30
This proposition-that law is in substance not logically predict-
able-is the most important of the applications of the theory of
legal history to dogmatic study, since it establishes the further
propositions that, after following "the existing body of dogma
into its highest generalization by the help of jurisprudence," 11
the methods of dogmatic study are, in the sixth place, "to dis-
cover from history how it has come to be what it is; and, finally,
so far as you can, to consider the ends which the several rules
seek to accomplish, the reasons why those ends are desired, what
is given up to gain them, and whether they are worth the
price." 32
Thus, the exposition of the canons of dogmatic legal study
eventuates, as does the theory of legal history, in stressing the
recognition of the "duty of weighing considerations of social ad-
vantage." 33
"I sometimes tell students that the law schools pursue an in-
spirational combined with a logical method, that is, the postu-
lates are taken for granted upon authority without inquiry into
their worth, and then logic is used as the only tool to develop
the results. It is a necessary method for the purpose of teach-
ing dogma. But inasmuch as the real justification of a rule of
law, if there be one, is that it helps to bring about a social end
which we desire, it is no less necessary that those who make and
develop the law should have those ends articulately in their
minds." 34
The argument, therefore, concludes in focusing attention upon
the third element, the rational or scientific ideal in law. The
formulation of the'legal process as logical in form but legisla-
tive in substance-in other words, essentially in terms of public
policy, social ends and the weighing of interests--states the
crucial problem of a realistic jurisprudence: How are the
factors that condition the law to be ascertained, analyzed and
evaluated? The answer is suggestive rather than detailed.
First, rational and scientific study is to be substituted for
reliance upon tradition:
"But the present has a right to govern itself so far as it can;
and it ought always to be remembered that historic continuity
with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity.
"I hope that the time is coming when this thought will bear
fruit. An ideal system of law should draw its posttilates and
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its legislative justification from science. As it is now, we rely
upon tradition, or vague sentiment, or the fact that we never
thought of any other way of doing things, as our only warrant
for rules which we enforce with as much confidence as if they
embodied revealed wisdom." 35
Second,
"The rational study of law is still to a large extent the study
of history. History must be a part of the study, because without
it we cannot know the precise scope of rules which it is our busi-
ness to know. It is a part of the rational study, because it is
the first step toward an enlightened scepticism, ihat is, towards
a deliberate reconsideration of the worth of those rules. When
you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what
is his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The
next is either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful
animal."
Third, the legal science of the future will involve "a substitu-
tion of quantitative for qualitative judgments." This for the
reason that "it is of the essence of improvement that we should
be as accurate as we can" in the measurement of competing
social ends. 37 "For the rational study of the law the black-letter
man may be the man of the present, but the man of the future
is the man of statistics and the master of economics." 39
Thus, both in dogma and in practice, the basis of law is to
be scientific. Holmes' view looks beyond formal traditionalism,
past even the prevailing standards of professional dogmatic
study, to the development of a rational legal science, more em-
pirical and less historical, directed to the more exact measure-
ment of social ends.
"I have had in mind an ultimate dependence upon science be-
cause it is finally for science to determine, so far as it can, the
relative worth of our different social ends, and, as I have tried to
hint, it is our estimate of the proportion between these, now
often blind and unconscious, that leads us to insist upon and
35Ibid. 139. "A body of law is more rational and more civilizizd when
every rule it contains is referred articulately and definitely to an end which
it subserves, and when the grounds for desiring that end are stated or
are ready to be stated in words.
"At present, in very many cases, if we want to know why a rule of law
has taken its particular shape, and more or less if we want to know why
it exists at all, we go to tradition.... It is revolting to have no better
reason for a rule of law than that it so was laid down in the time of Henry
IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down
have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation





to enlarge the sphere of one principle and to allow another
gradually to dwindle into atrophy. Very likely it may be that
with all the help that statistics and every modern appliance can
bring us there never will be a commonwealth in which science
is everywhere supreme. But it is an ideal, and without ideals
what is life worth? They furnish us our perspectives and open
glimpses of the infinite." 89
No greater praise could be given the conception of legal sci-
ence, thus fragmentarily sketched, than that, after fifty years,
it is still prophetic. The formulation of legal evolution in terms
of social ends is of itself a thesis, more profound and universal,
more trenchant, than Maine's theorem "from status to contract"
or Tarde's law of imitation. And it has a range and vitality
which avoids the formalism and lack of perspective in much
historical work, such for instance as that of Ames. Its great
virtue, however, is to turn historical study upon tradition and
thus to suggest the basis for a more rational consideration of
legal problems. This lesson, read in the very heyday of the
historical school, was a service not fully recognized in its time;
it is still to be taken to heart by legal history.
The quality of Holmes' view of legal science is that it is
practical. It is no derogation of its validity to point out that
this very quality suggests limitations, which, indeed, may very
well be fortuitous. It is not to be forgotten that the subject
of the lectures on The Common Law was not legal history but
the common law system, and that the principal addresses were
to the profession-to law students and lawyers, not to scientists.
Hence, to avoid misconstruction from the point of view of legal
science, positions are not to be taken out of context. Thus, for
instance, the practical study of legal history is not without peril
in narrow minds; much as such study is needed, much as anti-
quarian irrelevance is to be eschewed, it needs to be supple-
mented, as indeed Holmes intimates, by the more remote mor-
phological study of legal institutions and ideas with reference
to their social conditions, ends and effects. Again, the defini-
tion of legal study as being directed to "the prediction of the
incidence of the public force through the instrumentality of the
courts," 40 is, as it stands, perhaps appropriate to professional
legal study; but for legal science it needs to be defined in terms
39 Ibid. 242. "I look forward to a time when the part played by history
in the explanation of dogma shall 'be very small, and instead of ingenious
research we shall spend our energy on a study of the ends sought to be
attained and the reasons for desiring them. As a step toward that ideal
it seems to me that every lawyer ought to seek an understanding of eco-
nomics. The present divorce between the schools of political economy
and law seems to me an evidence of how much progress in philosophical
study still remains to be made." Ibid. 195.
40 Ibid. 167.
[Vol..40
1931) JUSTICE HOLMES' VIEW OF LEGAL SCIENCE 703
of the total social situation, including and beyond the profession.
No more, for science, can the basis of prediction be limited to the
reports or even the official records. So too, disinterest in foreign
legal systems is, because life is short, understandable in pro-
fessional legal study but not in the university of science. In
any event, the limits of legal science are set neither by the pro-
fession nor by the common law. Holmes' view of legal science
attributes to the practical the penetration of a profound and
realistic philosophy of enlightened scepticism. It neither asks
nor admits that the lines of the practical should be drawn so
straightly or so traditionally as to defeat its own ends.
It would be a fascinating task, one too formidable to be now
essayed, to project against the canvas of Holmes' conception
the slow progress of legal science in this country during the
past fifty years. Certain points, however, stand out. There is,
for instance, the Restatement of the Law, foretold with startling
prescience forty-five years since. 1 The central canons of ob-
jectivity in the study of dogma, of emphasis upon the conscious
evaluation of social ends in law, have presaged the most signifi-
cant developments in legal thought in this country since 1900.
These have been the moving ideas of analytical, sociological and
functional jurisprudence. Yet even so, the vital inferences await
realization. We have been too content with lip service to the
thesis that the law is in its grounds legislative and its logic
merely formal. As Jerome Frank has sufficiently pointed out,
we still pursue the illusion of certainty and seek repose in the
logic of tradition. -2 Dogmatic theory and theoretic dogma yet
prevail. And in spite of aspiration, the descriptive basis and
the methods of more precise measurement of social ends are, in
the main, yet to be ascertained. Thus Holmes' great concep-
tion of rational legal science as the basis of law still holds the
burden of our hopes. It commands the future, a valid but im-
perfectly realized ideal.
41 "The law has got to be stated over again; and I venture to say that
in fifty years we shall have it in a form of which no man could have
dreamed fifty years ago. And now I venture to add my hope and my belief,
that, when the day comes which I predict, the Professors of the Harvard
Law School will be found to have had a hand in the change not less im-
portant than that which Story has had in determining the form of the
text-books of the last half-century." Ibid. 42.
42 FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
